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WAS RICHARD v BBC CORRECTLY DECIDED? 
 





The recent judgment in Richard v BBC is already proving to be enormously controversial.
1
 Although 
only a High Court decision, it has generated the sort of debate, both in academic commentary and the 
popular press, not seen in a long time in privacy law.  It even eclipses the reaction to Max Mosley’s 
successful claim back in 2008 (where the negative response came exclusively from the press).  In a 
sense, this controversy is good, because privacy law is an area that deserves rigorous discussion about 
its nature and its limits.  But, at times, the debate can feel frustrating – particularly when scholarship 
in this field is presented as a question of picking a side: “team privacy” or “team press freedom”.  
Such polarisation presents press freedom and privacy as a dichotomy.  This is not wholly unjustified.  
But it does bring with it a serious risk that we will lose sight of the fact that both are vital political 
rights, which have, by common consensus, at least a rough equality of importance.  Some cases, of 
course, raise no real privacy issues; others raise no great press freedom issues.  But we must not lose 
sight of the importance of ensuring our system of privacy law is sufficiently calibrated to be sensitive 
to the legitimate claims of both rights in finely balanced cases.  If the law is to truly take these rights 
seriously, it must find ways to accommodate both defensibly.  For this reason, in our work, both of us 
have tried to pursue this holistic project through the criticisms of doctrinal failings and the 
engagement with the deeper, philosophical claims that must animate one’s understanding of both 
rights.  We do this not because we think that either privacy or press freedom is seriously imperilled 
but because we think that English law, at a systemic level, still needs some fine tuning. 
For us, Richard v BBC is significant because it is yet another case that raises important 
questions about the mechanics of determining privacy claims.  We both recognise that these concerns 
are real, and that they are not necessarily easily resolved.  This recognition manifests in our 
disagreement about how this sort of case ought to have been decided.  There are points we agree on, 
but there are several others on which we are some distance apart.  For instance, whereas we both 
agree, to a great extent, on the ideal of privacy law, as realised in the misuse of private information 
tort (MPI), we disagree on how that ideal ought to play out on the facts of the case.  Given this, it 
occurred to us that presenting our disagreement may serve the literature, in some small way, by 
highlighting some of the choices and issues that UK privacy law has yet to grapple with satisfactorily.  
To this end, we present these opposing views in this article. In the first section, Wragg argues that the 
case of Richard was wrongly decided. In the second section, Bennett responds to Wragg’s argument, 
and makes the case that the decision in Richard was broadly correct. We present our arguments 
without any joint conclusion, thereby leaving readers to reach their own conclusions about the case, 
and, more importantly, the choices that ought to be made in developing privacy law.  
 Many will be familiar with the facts of the case, but they are worth briefly restating at the 
outset. In 2014, South Yorkshire Police (SYP) raided the home of the famous singer, Sir Cliff 
Richard, following an allegation of an historic sexual assault. A source at SYP informed the BBC 
about the raid in advance of it taking place. Believing themselves to have secured a “scoop”, staff at 
the BBC prepared for live coverage of the raid. On the day of the raid, live video footage of it was 
broadcast on the BBC’s news services. Aerial footage was shot from a helicopter. Police officers 
could be seen through the windows of Richard’s home, going through his belongings, and removing 
large numbers of items, including computers, from the residence. No charges were ever brought 
against Richard as a result of the investigation. Richard brought claims in MPI against both SYP and 
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the BBC. SYP settled the claim, but the claim against the BBC went to trial. At trial, Mann J found 
the BBC liable. 
 
 




There are three reasons why I think Richard v BBC is wrongly decided.  One, it seems to me that 
whilst a wrong has been done to Sir Cliff, this was committed by the police when it, or someone 
within it, disclosed information to the BBC that Sir Cliff was being investigated as part of Operation 
Yewtree (it must be stressed that the CPS announced on 16 June 2016 that no charges would be made 
against Sir Cliff and that, as was said in court, ‘he is an innocent man in the eyes of the law’);2 
Secondly, I think that the High Court made significant errors of law, not fact, that render the decision 
eminently appealable (ie, it is not simply that I think the judge made findings of fact that I do not 
agree with); Thirdly, I think the ramifications of the judgment have larger ramifications that ought to 
have played a greater part in the decision, relating to the findings of law about i) the reasonable 
expectation of privacy (REOP) that pre-charge suspects have and ii) the public interest in publicising 
the activities of the police.  I do not doubt that others will disagree with me and I welcome their 
response.  There are broader public policy issues raised by the case that require serious attention and 
considered debate.  This is all the more important if the BBC is unable to obtain permission from the 




I must stress that I have great sympathy with Sir Cliff Richard’s position.  He does not deserve what 
he has been through.  In defending the BBC, as I will shortly, I do not say anything about the ethics of 
what they did, only the position in law.  I am sympathetic to the argument that a complaint (singular 
or plural) about compliance with their ethical code ought to be raised, although appreciate that the 
outcome of that, even if successful, would not generate the same level of vindication as the court case 
has. 
 
iii) The Administration of Privacy Claims 
 
Finally, I must take this opportunity for a personal gripe.  MPI is a fascinating area and raises 
genuinely perplexing issues that deserve great reflection.  But I am not convinced that, even though 
reasonable people may disagree on the outcome, the case necessitated a judgment of some 122 pages 
and 454 paragraphs (somewhere, Lord Denning is spinning in his grave).  I suspect I am not alone in 
feeling mystified at the level of detail some privacy cases attract and it concerns me that these 
decisions can read as if MPI is an unusual area of law, or one not often litigated (ie, like Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress), or one of such esoteric qualities that every principle needs reams of 
supporting literature and case law analysis.   
 
I do not think the issues in Richard v BBC needed the level of volubility on the facts let alone the law.  
There were three questions to answer here: 1) did Sir Cliff Richard have a REOP as against the BBC 
in the information that he was being investigated as part of Operation Yewtree?  2) if so, was there a 
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public interest in publicising this information?  3) Did the extent of that public interest warrant the 
damage done to his legitimate interest in privacy? 
 




i) Did Sir Cliff Richard have a REOP as against the BBC in the information that he was being 
investigated as part of Operation Yewtree? 
 
The finding in Sir Cliff’s favour on REOP stems chiefly from Mr Justice Mann’s conclusion that, 
when determining the existence of a REOP, the court needs look no further than the quality of the 
information at stake.  That the SYP had conceded in earlier litigation that they had breached Sir 
Cliff’s REOP was taken as proof that he had a REOP against the BBC. 
 
We see this conclusion in two places.  Here: 
 
‘Sir Cliff’s rights in respect of the information in the hands of the police are not based on a 
reasonable expectation of privacy as long as the information does not fall into the hands of the 




‘there is no basis for saying that a reasonable expectation of privacy, which previously 
existed, is somehow removed, or requires a complete reconsideration, merely because the 
information has come into the hands of the media… What matters is the substance of what is 
protected, and the substance of the protection.’4  
 
Let us put to one side that the SYP conceded the point on REOP; it was not judicially determined.
5
  
Let us assume that, had they disputed it, the court would have had good grounds to find against them, 
for reasons I will make clear shortly. 
 
I disagree with the legal analysis about REOP on two related grounds: one, the context in which 
information is received also goes to the REOP determination, as the Court of Appeal decision in 
Murray v Express Newspapers Ltd
6
 makes clear:  
 
 ‘the question whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy is a broad one, which takes 
account of all the circumstances of the case. They include the attributes of the claimant, the 
nature of the activity in which the claimant was engaged, the place at which it was happening, 
the nature and purpose of the intrusion, the absence of consent and whether it was known or 
could be inferred, the effect on the claimant and the circumstances in which and the purposes 
for which the information came into the hands of the publisher.’ (emphasis added)7 
 
Now, notice I have cherry-picked here what I take to be most relevant.  Clearly, I cannot ignore that 
the effect on the claimant is also important as is the absence of consent and the inference of such.  
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Neither do I ignore the ethical issues about the circumstances in which the information was received 
(although I suspect that this is intended to refer to surreptitious recording of information as in 
Campbell and Murray itself, rather than that the information was leaked). 
 
But, I do not think these concessions do much violence to my ultimate point: that the difference in 
identity between the SYP and the BBC is different because their intentions for the information were 
different (but I’ll expand on this in a moment).  Let me conclude this first point by highlighting some 
simple examples: a person will not have the same REOP when in the public toilet and the toilet at 
home, even though the information received by the stranger in one context and the spouse/partner in 
the other is identical; similarly, the REOP claim is different when a full body-scanner is used by 
airport security and by the average employer, even though the information obtained is identical; 
finally, the REOP as against the private investigator who tracks my movements and the local council 
whose CCTV cameras essentially do the same is different even though the information may be 
identical.  
 
My second point on the REOP is the difference in obligation between SYP and the BBC as against Sir 
Cliff (or anyone else).  Put simply, SYP, as a public authority, does have an absolute obligation under 
the Human Rights Act 1998 to act compatibly with human rights (this is not to say that the Art 8 right 
is absolute; it is not).  The disclosures made by SYP to the BBC (inadvertently or not) clearly 
breached those obligations and could not be excused on operational grounds.  There was no claim, for 
example, that publicity might generate further evidence. 
 
The position against the BBC is more complicated but, ultimately, weaker.  There is some merit (and 
some mileage left) in asking whether the BBC is a public authority under the HRA.  To my mind, this 
question has never been answered satisfactorily but to the extent it has been examined, the answer 
appears to be no.  For example, see the Joint Committee on Human Rights in the 2003/04 session
8
 
which makes no reference to the BBC on this point.  But even if it is, the obligation owed by the BBC 
must be tempered by its obligations as a broadcaster of news – a function that SYP does not have – 
and which clearly speaks to the final consideration in the Murray test, the purposes for which the 
information came into their hands.  
 
There are important operational reasons why investigations need to be kept secret, eg, to avoid tipping 
off either the suspect or his/her accomplices.  But, of course, these are matters of confidentiality.  The 
privacy aspect here relates to the sensitivity that the police ought to have toward those suspected of a 
crime before they have been charged.  Whereas I do not say that this consideration is absolute, it is 
understandable why those considerations ought to arise as part of the police’s obligations to the public 
under the Human Rights Act 1998. 
 
But the BBC is not in the same position.  The question of REOP for the police and the BBC is 
different.  As against the SYP, it is: was it reasonable for the claimant to expect that news of the 
impending search would not be distributed to the press, including the BBC?  As against the BBC, it is: 
was it reasonable for the claimant to expect that the BBC would not broadcast the search of his 
property by the police as part of their investigation into him about allegations of non-recent criminal 
behaviour?  The distinction may be subtle but it is important. 
 
Why is it important?  In short, because the BBC, in monitoring the police, and its activities, serves the 
public interest.  Now, at this point, I do not wish to confuse the public interest in publication with the 
REOP relating to that activity, albeit it is difficult, certainly here, to maintain a neat distinction.  But 
the question, to my mind, is the reasonableness of the claimant expecting the BBC to respect his 
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privacy in circumstances where it knows he is being investigated as part of Operation Yewtree – and, 
although it does not arise on the facts (I do not think), it is not irrelevant that the BBC has received 
much criticism for its silence in the Savile saga.   
 
Is Sir Cliff’s expectation reasonable?  Perhaps so, perhaps not, but I think the question is more finely 
balanced than Mann J recognises. 
 
In fairness, he recognises something of the difficulty, as when he notes Lady Justice Sharp’s 
observation in PNM (when it was still known as that) that there is ‘a growing recognition that as a 
matter of public policy, the identity of those arrested or suspected of a crime should not be released to 
the public save in exceptional and clearly defined circumstances’.9  Yet his reliance on this principle 
is weakened by the failure to observe the distinctive obligations that the police and BBC have. 
 
His reasoning also speaks to, I think, an unhappy conflation of privacy harms (such as emotional 
distress) with reputational concerns, as when he says ‘the consequences of such an accusation 
[specifically, Operation Yewtree] in that form are something that should be taken into account in 
considering whether the suspect has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the fact of the 
investigation’ [246].  This strikes me as relevant only after the police investigation is concluded.  
Then, if the claimant’s reputation is impugned, he has a claim in defamation.  It is important that 
privacy law is not used to shortcut the perceived deficiencies of contempt of court laws or defamation.  
All of this, though, is recognised in Khuja v Times Newspapers Ltd – a case that Mann J notes, but 
largely ignores. Instead, he finds:  
 
‘It seems to me that on the authorities, and as a matter of general principle, a suspect has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to a police investigation, and I so rule.’10 
 
As against the police, this is undoubtedly correct – but it is rather more doubtful when it is the press 
that discloses the information.  It is also very troubling for the chilling effect that this ruling has on 
press freedom.  I appreciate the term ‘chilling effect’ is used far too often, but here it strikes me as an 
accurate prediction.  Admittedly, Khuja was about a person’s identity being revealed in open court 
and subsequently published by the press.  But the reasoning strikes me as applicable to the police 
process as a whole – but, anyway, the majority of the Supreme Court was adamant that this could not 
give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
 
The situation in Richard is different.  It is about a police investigation – and recently there have been 
some troubling decisions which suggest there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in being 
interviewed by the police and these cases are discussed by Mann J.  Yet, these cases cannot stand for 
the proposition that there is always a reasonable expectation of privacy when a person is investigated 
by the police.  That would be against public policy; it would provide space for corruption, particularly 
where powerful figures are under scrutiny; we do not want the press to decide that they had best not 
reveal the names of those investigated for fear of being sued.  All of this is recognised by Mann J, I 
think – certainly he sees that legal recognition of a reasonable expectation of privacy in these 
circumstances is highly fact-sensitive and requires some aggravating factors before it can arise. 
 
But, at the very least, we might say that police interview under caution involves a degree of 
discretion, at least as far as police respect for privacy goes.  It can be done quietly, away from public 
scrutiny and there are obvious instances where this has advantages for police investigation, 
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particularly where there is a fear of tipping off.  The execution of a search warrant, though, is 
materially different.  It is unpersuasive to say that this happens in private (even if it happens very 
early in the morning, and even if no one is about).  It happens in plain sight – regardless of whether 
anyone sees it or not.  Obviously, there is a material difference between that which is observed by 
passers-by and that which is broadcast to the world at large.  But, if anything, that goes to the second 
stage of the Campbell test, not the first. 
 
It seems to me there is more reason to doubt the existence of the REOP than Mann J allows; I do not 
think the law is correctly stated or administered.  
 
ii) Was there a public interest in publicising this information? 
 
Even if I am wrong on that point, though, issues arise on the court’s handling of the second stage, 
especially on the question of whether there was a public interest in publication.   
 
On this, Mann J found that there was not because of a) the BBC’s conduct in publishing the 
information (that it was more interested in beating a competitor than serving the public interest; and b) 
that whereas Operation Yewtree is a matter of public interest, the names of suspects are not. 
 
We see a) arise here: 
 
‘For what it is worth, I do not believe that this justification [the public interest] was much in 
the minds of those at the BBC at the time. I think that they, or most of them, were far more 
impressed by the size of the story and that they had the opportunity to scoop their rivals’.11  
 
And later, here: 
 
‘To that extent it can be said that the BBC did not quite comply with what it itself saw as the 
ethical requirements of its journalism at that stage. The real reason for that was, in my view, 
because it was giving a lot of weight, in its own deliberations, to preserving the exclusivity of 
its own scoop.’12  
 
And, as if he had not rebuked the BBC enough,  
 
‘That narrative does not really do justice to the quality of the broadcasts. They were, as I have 
said, presented with a significant degree of breathless sensationalism.’13  
 
We see b) here: 
 
‘Knowing that Sir Cliff was under investigation might be of interest to the gossip-mongers, 
but it does not contribute materially to the genuine public interest in the existence of police 
investigations in this area. It was known that investigations were made and prosecutions 
brought. I do not think that knowledge of the identity of the subject of the investigation was a 
material legitimate addition to the stock of public knowledge for these purposes.’14  
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In this post-Yewtree age, this sort of cavalier statement is not only remarkable but quite dangerous.  
Clearly, it has a chilling effect on press freedom.  It is here that, I think, Mann makes two further 
mistakes relating to a) the judicial method of determining if a public interest exists; b) the significance 
of the speaker’s motives and the quality of their journalism when making that assessment.   
 
That this happens is strange because Mann J recognises the context of this sort of arrest: 
 
‘The whole thing [Yewtree and Rotherham] was very much a source of legitimate public 
interest and concern, and the public had a legitimate interest in knowing at a general level that 
the police were pursuing alleged perpetrators, and particularly those who might have abused 
their celebrity status. At that level, therefore, information about the inquiry did… contribute 
to a debate of general public interest.’15  
 
But concludes:  
 
‘The second part involves the element of identifying the individual concerned. It does not 
follow that, because an investigation at a general level was a matter of public interest, the 
identity of the subject of the investigation also attracted that characterisation. I do not think 
that it did.’16  
 
At this point, it seems to me Mann J is again unhelpfully conflating privacy with reputation.  Clearly, 
significant reputational damage can be done by press reports that imply a connection with Yewtree.  
All that is understood.  But that analysis is post-investigation, not pre-.   
 
But Mann J sees things differently: 
 
‘I acknowledge a very significant public interest in the fact of police investigations into 
historic sex abuse, including the fact that those investigations are pursued against those in 
public life. The public interest in identifying those persons does not, in my view, exist in this 
case.  If I am wrong about that, it is not very weighty and is heavily outweighed by the 
seriousness of the invasion.’17  
 
This is problematic – as is the view that the journalistic quality of the broadcast was also material.  
Judges should not act as editors or arbiters of taste.  All of this is very well established.  It is not for 
judges to chastise any journalist for failing to reach high ethical standards. 
 
But, most fundamentally, I think Mann J is simply wrong about what this broadcast represents.  Two 
points are important: first, the finding of a public interest is an objective, not subjective, matter.  
Ultimately, it is irrelevant what the press thinks is the public interest in the story, because this goes to 
motive.  And motive can have no bearing on our understanding of public interest.  Of course the BBC 
sent up the helicopter because Sir Cliff Richard was involved and not Richard Cliff, painter and 
decorator.  And, of course, there is no public interest in knowing what Sir Cliff Richard is up to these 
days, how he fills his time, what his favourite pastimes are.   
 
But the public interest here is not about Sir Cliff Richard, it is about SYP.  It is about the fact that 
SYP had convinced a judge the investigation was sufficiently serious to issue a search warrant.  That, 
of itself, is in the public interest.  Now, Mann J recognises this, sort of, but says there is no public 
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interest in knowing of this unless there are operational reasons for disclosure (by which he means that 
additional or fresh evidence might be disclosed).  But this is wrong.  There is always a public interest 
in knowing what the police does in the public’s name.  There is always a public interest in knowing 
how the police interact with celebrity – and the upper echelons of society: Are they intimated?  Do 
they apply the law equally?  In other words, the rule of law is firmly in view. 
 
But Mann J dismisses this sort of argument firmly out of hand: 
 
‘In evidence there was an attempt by Mr Smith to justify the use of the helicopter as providing 
evidence as to what was going on inside, as if some form of verification was necessary or 
appropriate. I find that that was a spurious justification. The helicopter shots did not verify or 
evidence anything particularly useful or controversial that needed evidencing. They were 
moving pictures of the property, of seven or eight people in plain clothes walking to a 
building, the same people walking back to their cars and fuzzy shots of two or three people in 
Sir Cliff’s flat. It may have made for more entertaining and attention-grabbing journalism. It 
may be justifiable or explicable on the footing that TV is a visual medium and pictures are 
part of what it does. It did not, however, add any particularly useful information.’18  
 
This misses the point.  It is wrong.  Even if the images are entirely mundane, the public interest is 
served. 
 
iii) Did the extent of that public interest warrant the damage done to his legitimate interest in 
privacy? 
 
Now, there is merit in saying that (as Mann J does) ‘the consequences of a disclosure for a person 
such as Sir Cliff are capable of being, and were, very serious’19 and that these outweighed the public 
interest at stake.  This conclusion would be remarkable of itself because, as I have said before,
20
 the 
problem with MPI is that judges do not really balance the respective weights of the two claims (even 
when they say they do), they instead apply a simple rule: if there is a public interest in publication, the 
claim fails; if not, the claim succeeds.  This would explain Mann J’s insistence that there is NO (or de 
minimis) public interest at stake. 
 
Let us consider the two claims.  On the one hand, I say that there is a strong public interest here in 
knowing how the police conduct investigations against the upper echelons of society.  This goes 
directly to the rule of law.  On the other hand, there is the damage done to Sir Cliff Richard.  But what 
is that damage?  The Campbell decision, and others, tell us that privacy is about dignity and 
autonomy.  What was it about the reporting that caused harm to Sir Cliff’s dignity and autonomy?  It 
is tolerably clear that he was most concerned about (and most affected by) the intrusive nature of the 
coverage (the helicopter recording events as his possessions were taken out of his flat) and the 
reputational harm.  Let us put reputational harm to one side (because that is properly dealt with 
through defamation – or, if it is not, then we shall need another full-length article to analyse the 
point).  What threat to dignity and autonomy arises from the recording, via helicopter, of his 
possessions being captured by the police?  I do not say there is no damage to these values, but is it at 
the same level as the damage done in the Mosley case,
21
 or the Tulisa case,
22
 or AMP v Persons 
                                                          
18 Ibid, [300]. 
19 Ibid, [316]. 
20 See, eg, Paul Wragg, ‘Protecting Private Information of Public Interest: Campbell's Great Promise, 
Unfulfilled’ (2015) 7(2) Journal of Media Law 225 and ‘The Benefits of Privacy-Invading Expression’ 
(2013) 64(2) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 187. 
21 Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 687 (QB). 
22 Contostavlos v Mendahun [2012] EWHC 850 (QB). 
Unknown,
23
 or the McClaren case
24
 (where the claim failed because the public interest outweighed it) 
or the YXB v TNO 
25
case (just read the first section to see my point in action). 
 
I do not think so.  Consequently, even if it is accepted that damage is done to Sir Cliff’s privacy 
interests, that damage is less than in other cases – which I say makes it medium rather than high – as 
against the public interest in publication, which I say is high. 
 
Now, as I say, reasonable people can disagree about the weight attached to the two claims.  But what 
needs serious thought is the consequence, if any, of this case and others like it.  Are we certain that we 
want suspects to have the sort of privacy rights that Richard v BBC implies? 
 




Wragg takes the view that the reasoning of Mann J in Richard is deficient in a number of respects, 
and that his disposal of the case is unsatisfactory.  In this section, I respond to Wragg’s argument and 
make the case that, notwithstanding some deficiencies in the judgment, the disposal of the case was 
essentially sound.  
 
Wragg takes issue with Mann J’s treatment of both elements of the claim in MPI. The first element is 
the question of whether the claimant (C) has a reasonable expectation of privacy in respect of the 
information the publication of which forms the basis of the complaint. The second element is the 
question of whether, assuming C has a reasonable expectation of privacy, that privacy interest is 
outweighed in an objective balancing test by the public interest in publishing the information. 
 
In respect of the “reasonable expectation” question, Wragg argues that Mann J incorrectly treated 
Richard’s reasonable expectation claim against the BBC as if it were the same as that which Richard 
had against SYP. Wragg says this is a misunderstanding of the legal test in question; whilst Richard 
may have had reasonable expectations of privacy against both the BBC and SYP, they were not the 
same reasonable expectations (because the BBC and SYP serve different functions). He goes on to 
argue that Richard ought to have found it more difficult to establish a reasonable expectation vis-à-vis 
the BBC than Mann J seems to have appreciated, though he stops short of arguing that there was no 
valid basis upon which Mann J could have found such a reasonable expectation. 
 
In respect of the question of balancing in the public interest, Wragg argues that Mann J misunderstood 
the objective nature of the test. For the true public interest in the BBC’s broadcast concerned the 
police: it was the public interest “in knowing how the police conduct investigations against the upper 
echelons of society”.26 It matters not, Wragg insists, that the BBC thought the public interest in the 
story centred on Sir Cliff Richard’s identity, rather than the police’s conduct of its investigation. All 
that matters is that the broadcast contributed to informing the public about this issue which is of 
public interest. As such, when Mann J says there was no public interest in the BBC’s broadcast, he is 
mistaken. This error comes from Mann J having been looking for public interest in the wrong place; 
he thought – as the BBC thought – that the public interest derived exclusively from Sir Cliff Richard’s 
identity. In reality, Wragg says, it was a very different public interest to do with police conduct. Once 
one realises that, it becomes apparent that there is some public interest and thus the learned judge’s 
conclusion – that there was no public interest in the BBC’s broadcast – is unsound. Moreover, a 
proper balance between these two competing interests would see the public interest claim succeed and 
the privacy claim fail, for little – if any – harm was actually done to Sir Cliff Richard’s privacy 
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interests by the BBC’s broadcasts. The only real harm here was caused by SYP’s indiscretion in 
revealing the impending raid to the BBC. 
 
For the reasons set out below, I find Wragg’s arguments on both elements in the judgment 
problematic, and offer the following critique in the interests of fostering discussion. 
 
b) Reasonable expectation of privacy 
 
The BBC and SYP are different types of organisation, serving different public functions. SYP is, 
undoubtedly, a public body and is thus bound by the s.6 Human Rights Act 1998 obligation to act 
compatibly with the rights enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The 
BBC’s status in this respect is less clear. It has been found to be a “hybrid” body – taking on the 
responsibilities of a public body – for the purposes of Freedom of Information law, but it may still lie 
outside the reach of s.6.
27
 In Wragg’s view, this distinction takes on considerable significance. SYP 
can readily be said to have breached Richard’s Art.8 ECHR right to private life when they revealed 
the fact that he was under investigation to journalists at the BBC, which amounts to an unlawful act in 
breach of s.6. As such, SYP’s liability was not challenged in court. The BBC, however, is not 
necessarily bound by s.6 and thus cannot be said automatically to have breached a statutory obligation 
either by soliciting the information or by broadcasting it and the police raid on Richard’s home. Any 
liability faced by the BBC arises at common law, not under the HRA. 
 
Wragg is absolutely correct in making these observations. But nothing in them necessitates the 
conclusion that Mann J was wrong to treat the BBC and SYP equivalently when determining the 
reasonable expectation question. For whilst SYP is bound by s.6, it is also capable of attracting 
liability at common law under the “tort” of MPI.28 The fact that SYP is a public body does not alter 
the test by which its potential liability in tort is decided; the test for SYP and the BBC, in MPI, is one 
and the same. 
 
The next objection Wragg raises to Mann J’s treatment of this question is that the differing functions 
served by the BBC and SYP necessitate the court phrasing its reasonable expectation question 
differently in respect of each organisation: 
 
As against the SYP, it is: was it reasonable for the claimant to expect that news of the 
impending search would not be distributed to the press, including the BBC?  As 
against the BBC, it is: was it reasonable for the claimant to expect that the BBC would 
not broadcast the search of his property by the police as part of their investigation into 




Wragg makes no mention of the BBC’s deliberate sourcing of the information from SYP in his 
reworked reasonable expectation question. However, it must surely be acknowledged that the 
reasonable expectation against the BBC goes not just to publication of the material, but to its 
acquisition. (In Tchenguiz v Imerman, we find Court of Appeal authority that could be mobilised to 
support this, with a modest amount of analogical argument.
30
) The reworked question thus ought to be, 
or at the very least to include the following: was it reasonable for the claimant to expect that the BBC 
                                                          
27 Sugar v BBC [2012] UKSC 4, [2012] 1 WLR 439.  
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have critiqued in an earlier essay. See Thomas DC Bennett, ‘Judicial Activism and the Nature of “Misuse 
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cited and accepted in the case. Moreover, the Court of Appeal opined that “the law should be developed 
and applied consistently and coherently in both privacy and ‘old fashioned confidence’ cases, even if they 
sometimes may have different features” (at [67]). 
would not seek out information pertaining to an impending police raid and then film and broadcast the 
execution of that raid in a highly intrusive manner? 
 
If one separates out the individual parts of the BBC’s conduct and subjects each to the question “does 
this give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy?”, the answer is likely to be “no” on most, if not 
all, counts. But this is not an appropriate way to look at what happened. Indeed, it cuts across the 
Court of Appeal’s guidance in Murray,31 which explicitly instructs the court to consider all of the 
circumstances in which the alleged privacy violation occurred. It is the totality of the BBC’s conduct 
in this matter – from its first steps into seeking out the information from SYP, to preparing for a large-
scale live broadcast operation, to the sensationalist and intrusive nature of the broadcast, informing the 
public of the nature of the investigation (ie. into an historic sex abuse allegation), and the inclusion of 
the fact that the person under suspicion was Sir Cliff Richard – that gives rise to the reasonable 
expectation. These matters must be viewed holistically. It was reasonable for Richard to expect that 
the BBC would not do all these things, together, and thereby victimise him. 
 
Wragg objects to analysing the reasonable expectation question in a more holistic fashion (though he 
does not appear to envisage such a broad contextual analysis as the one I have set out) in part because 
it conflates “privacy harms (such as emotional distress) with reputational concerns”.32 The 
consequences of falsely accusing a person of a serious crime (or of suggesting they are under 
investigation, as happened here) are not relevant to the reasonable expectation question, Wragg says. 
They may become relevant to a different action, further down the line – such as a claim in defamation. 
But, he argues, the reputational concern is distinct from the privacy harm and should play no part in 
establishing a claim in MPI. 
 
Mann J takes a rather different view of the relationship between privacy and reputational interests, and 
has done for some time. There is clear consistency in the manner in which this judge has approached 
this particular issue. In Hannon v News Group Newspapers Ltd, he refused to strike out a claim in MPI 
that, the defendant argued, was primarily to do with protecting the claimant’s reputation.33 In an earlier 
case, Terry v Persons Unknown, Tugendhat J had refused an application for interim injunctive relief 
on the basis that the claim, brought in MPI, was primarily to do with the claimant’s reputation, and 
that granting an interim injunction for breach of privacy would in effect usurp the stricter rules 
surrounding interim relief in defamation.
34
 In refusing to strike out the claim, Mann J distinguished 
Hannon from Terry, noting that, whilst Terry was solely concerned with the availability of interim 
relief, Hannon concerned the very question of liability under MPI. Hannon is of relevance here 
because much the same legal point was made by defence counsel in that case as is made by Wragg in 
his essay – that the only route of legal redress for reputational harm should be a defamation claim, and 
that a privacy claim should not encompass reputational concerns. In Hannon, responding to that 
argument, Mann J said: 
 
I am not satisfied that as a matter of principle it is necessary or appropriate, or even in 
some cases practically possible, to draw a hard line between the element of privacy or 





As Mann J notes, it is far from clear that harm to privacy and reputation need to be separated in the 
way Wragg suggests. Eric Descheemaeker has argued that one way in which tortious harms can be 
legitimately, coherently conceptualised is to conflate the wrongful act with the harmful 
                                                          
31 Murray v Express Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 446, [2009] Ch 481. 
32 XREF p 5. 
33 [2014] EWHC 1580 (Ch), [2015] EMLR 1. 
34 [2010] EWHC 119 (QB), [2010] EMLR 16. For comment on both Hannon and Terry, and the state the 
two cases have left the law in, see Eric Barendt, ‘An overlap of defamation and privacy?’ (2015) 7(1) 
Journal of Media Law 85. 
35 Hannon, n 33, [29]. 
consequences.
36
 He calls this a “uni-polar” model of harm. According to this model, the “harm” 
suffered by the victim is the very diminution in their right (to privacy) inherent in the defendant’s 
wrongful act. This sets the uni-polar model apart from its counterpart, the bi-polar model, whereby 
harm is separate from and consequent upon a wrongful act. The uni-polar model is actually the model 
of harm that appears to prevail in English privacy cases (the phone hacking case of Gulati v MGN
37
 
being a prime example), suggesting it would be appropriate (on coherence grounds) to deal with 




Furthermore, we know as a matter of law that the Art.8 ECHR right to private life contains a right to 
reputation.
39
 Viewed through the eyes of the Strasbourg Court, reputation is a privacy interest. And if, 
as Wragg later argues, privacy is conceptualised as an interest in one’s dignity and autonomy, it 
becomes entirely defensible – as a conceptual matter – to locate reputational interests within a broader 
privacy right.
40
 One’s reputation, after all, contributes to one’s dignity; to traduce one’s reputation 
(undeservedly) is to act with contempt for one’s dignity. A good reputation, moreover, contributes to 
our ability to lead autonomous lives; a bad reputation is likely to see avenues for self-advancement and 
self-development that we might choose to take (perhaps in our choice of employment) curtailed. Thus 
we might say – invoking the uni-polar model and this conceptual perspective on privacy – that a 
diminution in one’s reputation is a diminution in one’s right to private life. 
 
Three things may therefore be said in defence of Mann J’s treatment of this issue. First, it maintains 
consistency with his earlier judgment on the point (providing a degree of certainty and predictability). 
Second, it coheres with the prevailing model of harm in English privacy law (the uni-polar model).
41
 
Third, it fits within the European Court of Human Rights’ declaration that reputation is an aspect of 
the Art.8 right to private life. These points, moreover, are mutually supportive. 
 
However, Wragg has a further objection to Mann J’s judgment on this element of the claim. This 
objection comes from what he (Wragg) sees as its potential to set a precedent to the effect that a 
person suspected of a criminal offence has a reasonable expectation of privacy, effective against any 
and all defendants (including media outlets) in respect of the fact he or she is under such suspicion. 
This also appears to be the major objection to the case currently doing the rounds in news reports and 
newspaper opinion columns, and is likely to provide the motivation for an appeal. The ruling is, 
Wragg says, “very troubling for the chilling effect that [it] has on press freedom.”42 
 
Wragg’s concern here seems to me to be premature. The finding of a reasonable expectation of privacy 
is not a conclusive finding of liability. It is just the first stage in a two-stage process. Once established, 
the court moves on to balance that reasonable expectation against the public interest. To pray in aid the 
public interest in avoiding chilling effects on the press as a reason to find against a reasonable 
expectation of privacy jumps the proverbial gun. It is the same in defamation. For example: the 
Defamation Act 2013 creates the defence of publication on a matter of public interest (s.4). Much of 
the press was highly supportive of this legislation as a much-needed pro-defendant liberalisation of 
defamation law. S.4 does not prevent the court from finding that a piece of public interest journalism 
is prima facie libellous, but does give the defendant a strong defence once a prima facie case has been 
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38 As Descheemaeker (n 36) points out, this does have the potentially problematic effect of setting privacy 
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41 Mann J’s focus on “consequences”, as distinct from the wrongful act which causes them, does not map 
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of the claim – that reputational concerns are relevant to establishing a reasonable expectation of privacy – 
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42 XREF p 5. 
established. As such, a finding in a defamation case that accusing a person of murder is prima facie 
libellous does not set a precedent that accusing a person of murder will always result in liability. It 
simply enables the claim to move beyond the prima facie stage and on to the defence stage. 
 
“We do not want the press to decide that they had best not reveal the names of those investigated for 
fear of being sued,” says Wragg.43 But being sued is not the problem. The problem is being sued and 
losing as a result of having no defence. We all face liability for breaches of various legal obligations 
every day of our lives. If I tweet or re-tweet an allegation of criminal conduct about a person out into 
cyberspace, I may face liability in defamation – but only if I cannot raise a successful defence. Now, I, 
with my limited means and minimal public profile, am in a position to do far less damage to another’s 
reputation than the BBC, and I am also in a far weaker position to defend a claim against me for 
whatever damage I do cause. With the means to cause damage ought to come a responsibility to use 
those means carefully and with due regard to the harm we may cause our victims; with great power 
comes great responsibility. 
 
But Wragg’s argument cuts the other way. In his view, large media outlets should be granted the 
benefit of claims against them falling at the first hurdle, on the sorts of public interest grounds that 
ought to be considered at the second stage. He says this is a policy matter and he is right – it is. But the 
real policy question is not whether this would benefit the media (which it would), nor whether such a 
benefit to the media secures some public interest (which it may well do). The question is whether 
granting such a legal procedural benefit to defendants in privacy cases is a proportionate response to 
the fear of a chilling effect, given that it will seriously curtail opportunities for claimants to succeed in 
protecting their own privacy interests. 
 
This is not a new policy debate in tort law. The law has sought – and struggled – for many years to 
strike a balance between individual security and freedom of action.
44
 Speaking at a high level of 
generality, English tort law favours individual security over freedom of action. It prefers to keep open 
the possibility of recognising novel duties of care in negligence over the certainty that refusing to do 
so would give to the insurance industry. It prioritises our right to quiet enjoyment of our homes over 
the public benefit that nuisance-creating activities might provide. It has traditionally prioritised 
reputational interests over freedom of expression, although that balance shifted somewhat with the 
passing of the 2013 Act. The two sides of this debate can be characterised in many ways. Some prefer 
to talk of the competing claims on the loyalty of the law made by the ideals of corrective and 
distributive justice.
45
 (For instance, Lord Browne-Wilkinson said, in X (Minors) v Bedfordshire 
County Council, that corrective justice has the “first claim” on the loyalty of judges.46) So it might be 
said – in favour of keeping the public interest matters away from consideration at the reasonable 
expectation stage of an MPI claim – that to do so coheres with tort law’s long-standing preference for 
prioritising individual security (and thereby pursuing corrective justice). Or it might be countered that 
acceding to the Wragg-type position, and fixating on the potential “chilling effects” in order to support 
a finding that there is no reasonable expectation in a case like Richard, coheres with a contemporary 
trend in tort law away from individual security and towards freedom of action.
47
 The policy question 
underpinning this aspect of Richard is large and has significant implications. It raises rule of law 
questions, such as whether such policy matters ought even to be addressed by the courts or whether 
they should be left to legislators. Somewhat paradoxically, we tend to find that the sorts of media 
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Modern Law Review 681. 
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47 For example, the Supreme Court’s decision in the case of Coventry v Lawrence [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] 
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first at common law and then in statute, of public interest publication defences in defamation. 
outlets that continually flag up possible chilling effects on their ability to publish stories of interest are 
also the very outlets that take up arms against the development of the common law at the hands of 
judges.
48
 At one and the same time, they seek the greater protection that a judge developing the law in 
order to give effect to policy concerns can provide them with, and also evince a powerful disdain for 




Of course, Wragg (and others) might retort that the argument I have presented is hopelessly naïve for 
thinking that media outlets will routinely run the risk of publishing material that gives rise to a prima 
facie claim, even if it is expected that they would successfully defend the claim at stage two of the 
court’s analysis. Business does not thrive on such uncertainty, so the argument goes. Our media is 
commercial in nature and if it is not to collapse under the weight of its own insecurities, it needs 
assurances that public interest journalism will be fulsomely protected – even when it goes wrong.  
 
I may well be naïve in my outlook. But if our press is as risk-averse as this argument would suggest – 
and given its propensity for publishing and broadcasting stories that cause enormous harm to 
individuals, both deserving and undeserving, this is highly dubious – then it is not really a free press at 
all, in any meaningful sense. As ever, what the press and big media outlets really want is special 
treatment. It may be a good idea to give it to them. But, as Wragg rightly recognises, the decision to do 
so (or not) is one of policy; policy, moreover, that is intimately enmeshed with the legal doctrine in 
this field, the contours of which have been set out by appellate courts whose precedents bind the High 
Court. 
 
The common lawyer’s quick (and probably unsatisfactory) answer to this is that the elements of MPI, 
which were laid down by the House of Lords,
50
 can only be significantly altered legitimately – and 
certainly such a policy shift would be significant – by our highest court (or Parliament), and not by a 
court of first instance. Mann J’s ruling on the reasonable expectation question contains some 
confusing parts, which Wragg is right to criticise. But it essentially does that which is generally 
thought to be “right” in precedential terms: following the Court of Appeal’s Murray guidance (in 
spirit, if not always in express language), keeping the reasonable expectation question separate from 
public interest arguments and thereby adhering to the higher court precedents that have sketched out 
(admittedly incompletely) the contours of the law in this field. 
 
c) Balancing individual privacy against the public interest 
 
Wragg is justified in criticising Mann J for the way in which he went about dealing with the balancing 
test that forms the second stage of the MPI methodology. The learned judge regrettably falls into error 
in a manner to which Wragg, by virtue of his recent work, is acutely sensitive. Mann J found that there 
was no public interest in broadcasting the footage of the raid on Richard’s home for two reasons. First, 
because the BBC appeared not to believe in the public interest nature of the journalism itself; it was 
more concerned with beating its rivals to a big scoop. Second, because whilst the wide-ranging police 
investigation into historic sex offences known as Operation Yewtree is a matter of public interest, the 
names of individual suspects are not. 
 
Those who are familiar with Wragg’s work will instantly recognise the error that Mann J has 
committed here. It is that he has treated the question of public interest as an all-or-nothing matter; 
either there is public interest or there is none. Wragg has done the study of privacy jurisprudence a 
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great service by demonstrating – in forensic detail – that English courts almost always fall into this 
trap.
51
 Where a court finds that there is any level of public interest in published information, the claim 
fails. Conversely, in virtually every case where the claim succeeds, the court finds that there is no 
public interest at all. The chances of these findings accurately reflecting the true levels of public 
interest in play in these cases is remote. What is far more plausible is that in many cases there is some 
degree of public interest that might justify the privacy violation. And, of course, the very purpose of 
the balancing exercise in MPI is to determine whether that degree of public interest is sufficient to 
justify, on a test of proportionality, the infringement of the claimant’s privacy. 
 
Wragg argues that there is clearly a degree of public interest in the BBC’s broadcast in Richard. This 
public interest derives, he says, from the conduct of the police in investigating these sorts of offences, 
and in the execution of search warrants, being a matter of public importance: 
 
There is always a public interest in knowing what the police does in the public’s 
name.  There is always a public interest in knowing how the police interact with 
celebrity – and the upper echelons of society: Are they intimated?  Do they apply the 




Thus, Wragg argues, it is irrelevant that the BBC failed to appreciate the public interest nature of the 
journalism in which it was engaged; the point of an objective test is that it is open to the court to 
identify matters of public interest that the parties themselves may have overlooked. The problem with 
this is that it would not be a great extension of it to suggest that there is public interest in universal 
surveillance of the interactions between the police and anybody else.
53
 Giving the argument the benefit 
of the doubt, however, and assuming, arguendo, that there is such a public interest, it must (a) be fairly 
minimal in any individual case, and (b) of a sort that could quite straightforwardly be satisfied by far 
less intrusive means than the BBC deployed in this instance. (This is a matter of proportionality – 
something to which we will shortly return.) 
 
There is some public interest in the identity of criminal suspects. This has the potential also to be 
troubling, given that we live in a technologically interconnected age where being linked with a crime 
one has not committed can create a false impression that lasts indefinitely (particularly online). (It 
remains to be seen how effective enforcement of the “right to be forgotten” will turn out to be.) 
However, decisions to charge suspects are made by the Crown Prosecution Service only when there is 
a realistic prospect of securing a conviction. And since the evidence of a single complainant may not 
be sufficient to clear this hurdle (especially in historic abuse cases where there is a lack of hard 
evidence), it can be in the public interest to identify suspects so that further complainants, should there 
be any, have the opportunity to come forward. They could then potentially provide evidence that 
would corroborate the original complaint and bolster the chances of a conviction sufficiently to enable 
a charge to be brought to bear. This is the strongest reasonable argument against granting suspects pre-
charge anonymity (a move that is shortly to be the subject of a Private Member’s Bill in Parliament). 
Moreover, the Supreme Court in Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd held that the identity of an individual 
can add colour to a media report of an investigation, in a way that increases the chances of bringing 
matters of public interest pertaining to that investigation to the attention of the public.
54
 In Flood, this 
led the Supreme Court to hold that identifying the claimant in that case in a newspaper report (even 
though he turned out to be wholly innocent) was not only in the public interest, but a proportionate 
infringement of his privacy. The reasoning in Flood is deeply troubling for anyone who takes 
individual privacy rights seriously (it was not a case where unknown complainants might have come 
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forward with more evidence). But the simple fact of the matter is that it is a Supreme Court authority 
with clear relevance to Richard that ought either to have been applied by Mann J or explicitly 
distinguished. Unfortunately, Flood was not even mentioned in his judgment. 
 
The notion that the police conduct of raids connected with high-profile (or indeed, presumably, any 
other level of profile) investigations is an issue of public interest simply as a matter of course is (for 
the reasons elaborated above) problematic. But it is nonetheless possible, depending on the particular 
facts, for police conduct to be a matter of public interest in any given case. The objections raised 
herein to declaring a universal public interest of this sort notwithstanding, Wragg is undoubtedly 
correct to say that the legal test is an objective one and that this renders the BBC’s own lack of 
appreciation of the public interest in what they were doing irrelevant. Where Wragg’s analysis 
becomes problematic is with the notion that the public interest in the police conduct of raids (assuming 
that there is some), which was apparently served by broadcasting the execution of such a raid live on 
national television, justifies the broadcast as a proportionate infringement of Richard’s privacy. 
 
Any public interest in identifying Sir Cliff Richard as the subject of the investigation could 
proportionately have been served with a simple factual statement; the sensational live coverage filmed 
from a helicopter was far more intrusive than was necessary to satisfy that aspect of public interest. 
And so we are left with the question of whether the nature of the coverage was proportionate to the 
public interest in the conduct of the police served by the live filming. 
 
Wragg makes two points that suggest he thinks that the coverage was proportionate, to which a brief 
response may be offered. First, he queries what “damage” Sir Cliff Richard actually suffered. Once he 
discounts reputational harm as irrelevant (discussed above), he asks “[w]hat threat to dignity and 
autonomy arises from the recording, via helicopter, of his possessions being captured by the police?”55 
In his view, the only harmful conduct in this case was that of SYP (by informing the BBC of the 
impending raid); the BBC’s broadcast added nothing. Second, Wragg queries whether the harm 
Richard might have suffered at the BBC’s hands (if indeed there was some), rose to a comparable 
level to that which has attracted liability in other high-profile privacy cases:  
 
I do not say there is no damage to these values, but is it at the same level as the 
damage done in the Mosley case, or the Tulisa [Contostavlos] case, or AMP v Persons 
Unknown, or the McClaren case … or the YXB v TNO case…56 
 
My response would be thus. First, as a basic matter of causation, the BBC’s broadcast did add 
something – it added that which elevated the extent of the distress the claimant suffered to the level it 
reached. SYP’s act of informing the BBC about the impending raid would have caused minimal harm 
but for the BBC’s decision to give the raid on-air prominence. Moreover, Sir Cliff Richard’s dignity 
and autonomy were not merely threatened by the coverage; they were violated. His possessions were 
hauled out of his home live on national television. (Whilst the BBC’s motive is, as Wragg says, 
irrelevant to the question of public interest, there is still something striking about its own description 
of this as a “money shot”.57) There is nothing dignified about having the police go through your 
possessions, less still in having others watching while that happen, still less in those watchful eyes 
being those of 3.2 million strangers glued to their TV screens.
58
 His autonomy – his capacity to decide 
for himself who would see him and his possessions that day – was wholly subverted.  
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Second, each of the cases Wragg cites involves sexual matters – whether publication of the fact of an 
affair (as in McClaren
59









). The cases involving the dissemination of intimate pictures/footage immediately give rise 
to an intuitive feeling that the victim’s dignity and autonomy have been violated – we do not stop to 
query this. Even if we did, we would quickly conclude that our intuition was correct; people are rarely 
at their most dignified during moments of sexual ecstasy and, in any event, disseminating such 
pictures/footage clearly rides roughshod over the individual’s claim to decide for themselves under 
what circumstances and to whom sexual acts in which they are engage are revealed. But we should not 
fall into the trap of thinking that, just because most privacy cases in English law are about sex, all such 




The distress caused to Sir Cliff Richard is also relevant, as part of the violation of his dignity and 
autonomy. To knowingly or recklessly cause distress to a person – and there can have been no doubt 
that the BBC knew that its behaviour would cause Richard distress – is to treat that person without 
regard for their dignity. Distress does not manifest itself in humans voluntarily; to cause a person 
distress is to violate their autonomy, for they cannot control this emotional reaction. And what did we 
learn about the police raid that might justify these various violations of Richard’s privacy? We learned 
that the police go in in numbers. That they take everything of interest from a property. That they wear 
translucent plastic gloves when handling evidence. Most of this we knew already, of course, from 
watching police dramas on TV or in the movies. We learned far more about wrongdoing committed by 
SYP from the broadcasts of the Hillsborough disaster, but we do not repeat the footage of individuals 
being crushed in the crowd because to do so would be disproportionately distressing; we can learn 
what we need to know by ex post facto verbal or written reports. And so it is difficult to accept that 




There has already been, and will continue to be, much wringing of hands and public protestation about 
the dangerous precedent this case purportedly sets for public interest journalism. This is to be 
expected; it has happened every single time (which still adds up to fewer than ten) that a high-profile 
MPI claim has proceeded to trial and resulted in a claimant succeeding against a big media company. 
Campbell supposedly heralded the end of public interest journalism in 2004.
65
 Mosley did so again in 
2008.
66
 PJS did in 2016.
67
 By their own accounts, the news media – both print and broadcast – ought 
by now to have been utterly eviscerated by these dangerous precedents, but there they stand, as strong 
as ever. In other words, the boys in the British media continue to cry wolf, but there is no sign 
whatsoever of anyone being eaten.  
 
To stand accused – falsely – of a serious crime is undoubtedly one of the most distressing things that 
can happen to a person. Miscarriages of justice may be mercifully rarer than they once were, but as the 
recent scandal involving the CPS’s failure to disclose vital evidence in rape cases shows, they continue 
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to occur and with some regularity.
68
 To be under intense suspicion for a crime that one has not 
committed – even if one has yet to be “accused” of it – is not far removed from the trauma of a false 
accusation. In an era where journalists proclaim loudly the merits of “responsible journalism” in order 
to avoid liability for mishaps, and declare themselves proudly to be members of a largely responsible 
and trustworthy profession that is sensitive to the interests of individuals caught up in scoops, it is 
surely reasonable to expect these responsible journalists to behave … responsibly. 
 
No doubt, there may be times when exposing wrong-doing by the police (or other public servants) 
necessitates a proportionate violation of individual privacy. When such a time arises, I have no doubt 
that the committed and responsible people who make up the vast majority of journalists in this country 
will fearlessly report the truth. When that happens, the courts would do well to heed Wragg’s warnings 
about the dangers of treating public interest matters as all-or-nothing issues, and instead start engaging 
actively in a detailed, subtle and – above all else – genuine balancing exercise. But this was not such a 
case. The police told the Beeb they were going to raid Cliff Richard’s home and good ol’ Auntie 
thought this would make for a fabulous scoop – especially from a helicopter from which the “money 
shots” could most dramatically be filmed. As such, whilst Mann J’s judgment is far from perfect in the 
way that it understands and applies MPI doctrine, his disposal of the case – ruling that Sir Cliff 
Richard’s privacy was unlawfully violated – is, in my view, entirely correct. 
 
The material for this article appeared as separate blog-posts on inforrm.org.  It is republished 
here with kind permission. 
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68 See the Justice Select Committee’s report, Disclosure of evidence in criminal cases, published 20 July 2018. 
(Available at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmjust/859/85902.htm, 
accessed 26 July 2018.) 
